Understanding the role that drug adherence has on health outcomes in everyday clinical practice is central for the policy maker. This is particularly true when patients suffer from asymptomatic chronic conditions (e.g., hypertension, hypercholesterolaemia, and diabetes). By exploiting a unique longitudinal dataset at patient and physician level in Italy, we show that patients and physicians unobserved characteristics play an important role in determining health status, at least as important as drug adherence. Most importantly, we find that both adherence and prescribed treatment regimen effects are highly heterogeneous across physicians, highlighting their crucial role in shaping patients' health status.
Around the world CVDs remain the most common cause of death worldwide, with the 2013 Global Burden of Disease study estimating that CVDs caused 17.3 million deaths globally. It accounted for 31.5% of all deaths and 45% of all non-communicable disease deaths, more than twice that caused by cancer, as well as more than all communicable, maternal, neonatal, and nutritional disorders combined (Townsend et al., 2016) . 1 For these reasons, we believe that hypercholesterolaemia is a particularly interesting condition to analyse.
In terms of treatment, pure (or familiar) hypercholesterolaemia cannot be managed simply through changes in lifestyle and the only effective strategy is to comply with statin drugs. Since their introduction in 1987, statins became the main treatment to manage patients suffering from high levels of cholesterol. Currently, a large body of medical and clinical literature exists that proves the efficacy of statins in reducing CHD risk (see, among the others, Baigent, Keech, Kearney, & Blackwell, 2005) , although a large variation exists in the estimates across studies. Such evidence is gathered either from clinical trial studies (Helfand, Carson, & Kelley, 2004) or from real-world evidence obtained from population-level databases (Boswell, Cook, Burch, Eaddy, & Cantrell 2012; Simpson & Mendys, 2010) . Although randomised clinical trials remain extremely important in generating clinical knowledge, they generally report high adherence to and low discontinuation of statin therapy. Moreover, they usually have a limited external validity due to the small number of patients involved in each trial. On the contrary, population-level databases can provide evidence of the benefits and risks of medical interventions administered to a large number of patients treated in a variety of practice settings. Despite the richness of the information coming from both types of data, the existing literature has often failed to precisely measure the role of adherence, mostly because it has not taken into account patient and physician unobserved heterogeneity.
By exploiting the availability of longitudinal observations at patient and physician level, our analysis focuses on estimating the contribution of drug adherence and prescribed therapy regimen (PTR) on health outcomes, controlling for patient and physician observed and unobserved heterogeneity through the consistent method described in Abowd, Kramarz, and Margolis (1999) . In this way, we shed light on the joint role that available technologies (drugs in our case), physicians, and patients have in complementing drug therapy adherence to improve health outcomes. We assess the role of drug therapy adherence and PTR under different scenarios: (a) without taking into account patient and physician unobserved heterogeneity, (b) taking into account the unobserved heterogeneity of either patients or physicians, and (c) taking into account the observed and unobserved patient and physician heterogeneity while allowing for heterogeneous adherence and PTR effects as part of the physician effect. Our results show that physician unobserved heterogeneity is an important determinant of health status, although patient heterogeneity appears to be significantly more important in explaining its variability. Furthermore, we find that the role of drug adherence is attenuated when physician-and patient-specific unobserved factors are taken into account and that both adherence and PTR effects are highly heterogeneous across physicians. This evidence suggests that physicians play an important role in shaping patient health status, far beyond the standard determinants of health analysed by clinical and health economic literature.
The remainder of the paper proceeds as follows. Section 2 presents a short review of the existing literature on these topics. Sections 3 derives the empirical model. Section 4 illustrates the data and the methodological choices adopted to build our dependent variable and some regressors. Section 5 describes the adopted econometric strategy. Section 6 presents the main results. Finally, Section 7 concludes.
THE LITERATURE REVIEW
Factors that affects health outcomes can be classified into three broad categories: patient-related, physician-related, and team building-related. Patients can negatively contribute to health outcomes through lack of understanding of their disease, lack of involvement in the decision-making process, lack of adherence to therapy, and lack of medical literacy. On their side, physicians may fail to contribute to improve patient health outcomes, as they often do not recognise medication nonadherence in their patients, prescribe complex drug regimens without explaining their benefits and side effects, or do not take into account the potential financial burden for patients. Finally, the way patients and physicians interact may help overcome much of these difficulties. As highlighted by Koulayev, Skipper, and Simeonova (2013) , within the many providers, primary care (PC) physicians exert substantive influence on patients' health behaviour.
The vast majority of the literature in this sector has mainly focused on patient-specific factors influencing health outcomes, with special attention to adherence. In fact, the issue of adherence to therapy as the main driver of patient health outcomes has been extensively studied in the past years (see Ho, Bryson, & Rumsfeld, 2009; Iuga & McGuire, 2014 , for extensive reviews). These reviews show that nonadherence to therapies tends to lead to poor outcomes, which then increase health care service utilisation and overall health care costs. In general, these costs are then passed on to patients by payers or governments through higher copayment and/or taxes, which in turn impact negatively on the level of medication adherence and on health outcomes (see Atella, Depalo, Peracchi, & Rossetti, 2006; Atella & Kopinska, 2014) . For example, Sokol, McGuigan, Verbrugge, and Epstein (2005) point out that worse health outcome caused by nonadherence may be responsible for an extra 10% of hospitalisations. The main conclusions coming out from this literature are as follows: (a) a very large fraction of worldwide patients suffering from chronic conditions do not take medications as prescribed, (b) increasing adherence may be more beneficial to health outcomes than improvements in specific medical therapy/technology, and, finally, (c) adherence is particularly problematic in all those asymptomatic chronic conditions such as hypertension, hypercholesterolaemia, and diabetes, where a better adherence would yield very substantial health and economic benefits.
Limiting our review to CVDs, the medical literature has produced a large amount of evidence showing that adherence is one of the most important factors explaining health outcomes. For example, according to Bramley, Gerbino, Nightengale, and Frech-Tamas (2006) , high adherence (defined as medication possession ratio [MPR] of 80% to 100%) to antihypertensive medications is associated with higher odds of blood pressure control compared to those with medium or low levels of adherence. Similarly, each incremental 25% increase in proportion of days covered (PDC) for statin medications was associated with a 3.8-mg/dl reduction in Low Density Lipoprotein (LDL) cholesterol (Ho et al., 2006) . Furthermore, nonadherence to cardiovascular medications has been associated with increased risk of morbidity and mortality. For example, Rasmussen, Chong, and Alter (2007) find that nonadherence to statins in the year after hospitalisation for myocardial infarction is associated with a 12% to 25% increased relative hazard for mortality. Similar strong results are also found in the chronic coronary artery disease setting, where nonadherence to cardioprotective medications (blockers, statins, and/or angiotensin-converting enzyme inhibitors) is associated with a 10% to 40% relative increase in risk of cardiovascular hospitalisations and a 50% to 80% relative increase in risk of mortality. In addition, Hope, Wu, Tu, Young, and Murray (2004) show that poor adherence to heart failure drugs is associated with an increased number of cardiovascular-related emergency department visits. Similar studies can be found for other diseases, proving the important role of therapy adherence in determining patient health outcomes (Iuga & McGuire, 2014) .
Despite its relevance, in this type of literature, adherence is estimated in isolation with respect to other potential confounding factors, which represents a main limitation. As largely recognised by WHO (2003) , health outcomes are not exclusively a patient responsibility and represent complex phenomena that involve the joint effort of patients, physicians, and medical care organisation. In fact, health outcomes are often considered the results of complex communication problems between physicians (both PC and specialists) and patients, especially those suffering of chronic diseases. Furthermore, good health outcomes require a continuous and dynamic process between patient and physician, and "the lack of a match between patient readiness and the practitioner's attempts at intervention means that treatments are frequently prescribed to patients who are not ready to follow them. Health care providers should be able to assess the patient's readiness to adhere, provide advice on how to do it, and follow up the patient's progress at every contact" (WHO, 2003, p. XIV) . The importance of these long-term dynamic processes between patients and physicians are highlighted also by Carrera, Goldman, and Joyce (2013) in their analysis of the responses of physicians and patients behaviour to variations in the cost of drugs. In their review of the literature, they highlight the phenomenon of habit formation in prescribing, which could lead to inefficient outcomes even in the absence of monetary incentive. (Frank & Zeckhauser, 2007; Hellerstein, 1998; Levine Taub, Kolotilin, Gibbons, & Berndt 2011; Virabhak & Shinogle, 2005) .
Based on this literature, it is then clear that there are several unobserved patient and physician characteristics, potentially correlated with patient (observed) adherence, playing a crucial role for estimating the true effect of adherence and PTR on health outcomes. Although we realise this is not an easy task from an empirical perspective (and it remains an open issue for debate), in what follows, we propose an empirical strategy to minimise the omitted variable bias affecting the adherence and PTR effects.
CONCEPTUAL FRAMEWORK
According to the seminal model of Grossman (1972) , health can be considered a capital good subject to natural deterioration over the life cycle. Individuals may improve it through health-promoting behaviour such as, for instance, the maintenance of a healthy lifestyle or the consumption of targeted medical care. The latter strategy is particularly effective in the case of chronic diseases when diet and physical exercise are not enough to build up resistance to illness.
In Atella, Belotti, and Depalo (2011) , we propose a simple extension of the Grossman model where individual's health status depends on the level of medical treatment (drugs), on the natural health deterioration rate, and on the treatment efficacy. The original model is enriched by including several factors that could positively affect the effectiveness of drug treatment: (a) a proper treatment regimen resulting from a correct physician's evaluation of patient conditions and availability of pharmaceutical-embodied technical progress, (b) a greater patient's adherence to prescribed treatment, (c) a better patient endowment (for instance, in terms of education or genetic endowment), and (d) a better physician endowment (e.g., knowledge, communication skills, and ethics). 2 We then obtain an estimable health demand function, where the optimal stock of health H * it depends on the treatment efficacy ( it ), on the natural health deterioration rate ( it ), and on the price of medical care (p M,t ). More formally, we can write this function as
where ijt is the treatment regimen prescribed by physician j to patient i in period t, a it−1 is the patient i's adherence to treatment in period t − 1, u i represents time-invariant patient heterogeneity (e.g., gender and education), j represents time-invariant physician heterogeneity (e.g., reputation, skills, and ethics), and i is the fixed patient's genetic endowment.
From an empirical perspective, the previous literature has investigated the theoretical predictions of the Grossman model, often obtaining mixed results. 3 According to Wagstaff (1993) , this may likely be due to (a) the adoption of heterogeneous definitions of the (unobserved) stock of health, (b) the use of highly heterogeneous data, and (c) the different time span considered in the analysis.
To overcome some of these issues, our strategy to derive the empirical counterpart of Equation 1 is based on the observation that the individual stock of health is widely recognised to be a multidimensional construct and, most important, that different dimensions of health may be affected by different risk factors and evolutive processes (Crimmins, 2004; Verbugge & Jette, 1994) . Hence, as in Atella and D'Amico (2015) , we follow a disease-specific approach, assuming that the health demand function is specific of individuals suffering from a diagnosed chronic condition and that there exists a function relating the patient stock of health to a specific clinical marker of the disease (i.e., blood pressure, High Density Lipoprotein (HDL), LDL or total cholesterol (TC), hearth beat, and glycated haemoglobin). Even if the first assumption is somewhat restrictive, it allows to focus on a specific dimension of the stock of health, the latter being impossible to measure as a whole: This is a weakness shared with much of the existing literature. The second assumption provides the link, based on previous scientific knowledge, between the stock of health and a well-defined and objectively measurable health outcome.
A further important aspect to consider is that we investigate this phenomenon within the organisational setting of PC in Italy. This organisational setting simplifies most of the econometric analysis, as (a) it largely attenuates the concern of a selection bias due to a non-random location of physicians, (b) it largely attenuates the concern of a selection bias due to a non-random sorting of patients into physicians, and (c) it simplifies the agency relationship. Problems that, often, permeate studies are done in countries where a similar setting does not exists (see, e.g., the United States).
The selection bias due to a non-random location of physicians is weakened by the organisation and financing of PC in Italy. Indeed, physicians are not free to choose where to set up their practice but have to follow the geographical distribution defined by the "national contract": Vacant posts are published every 6 months by the regions, with assignments determined by the ranking achieved on the regional lists after a competitive examination. Once assigned to a local health authority (LHA), a doctor has the possibility to choose where to open his or her practice, but always within the LHA of assignment (see Hartmann, Ulmann, & Rochaix, 2006) . In general, practices tend to be located close to the old practice (sometimes in the same office) to avoid loosing patients. In terms of financing, salary is determined by the number of patients followed and not by the fees paid by them (this is why they tend not to move too far away from the place where the old practice was located), given that they are mostly remunerated on the basis of a capitation fee of about 50 euros per patient per year and under the constraint of a maximum of 1,500 patients. 4
2 The role that physician knowledge, communication skills, and ethics can have on health outcomes is widely acknowledged and supported by a large epidemiological literature on treatment effectiveness. Among others, Burroughs, Maxey, and Levy (2002) , Ginsburg, Donahue, and Newby (2005) , Mahlknecht and Voelter-Mahlknecht (2005) , Stewart (1996) , and Roter, Hall, and Aoki (2002) are good examples that support this hypothesis. 3 See in particular Cropper (1981) , Wagstaff (1986) , Wagstaff (1993) , Van Doorslaer (1987) , Zweifel and Breyer (1997) , Erbsland, Ried, and Ulrich (1995) , Nocera and Zweifel (1998), and Gerdtham, Johannesson, Lundberg, and Isacson (1999) . 4 In terms of salary, the most important source of income is capitation (70% of income on average)-the patient list depending on the physician's experience and the demographic characteristics of the patients-followed by subsidies for investments (10% to 15%) for medical integration, staff employed, equipment, and remuneration by performance (about 10%) in terms of meeting regional programme criteria or adopting cost control measures, fee-for-service for vaccinations, house calls, minor surgery, and issuing certificates.
As far as patients' selection is concerned, the channel for selectivity bias can be twofold. First, it may arise in the presence of non-random sorting of patients into physicians, for example, patients systematically choose the best physicians. Second, bias may occur in the presence of loss to follow-up, due for instance to patients' withdrawal related to health outcomes. We argue that the concern for the first type of bias is greatly weakened in the context of this paper. Indeed, Italian patients can choose their physician only from the list of family doctors available at the LHA of their place of residence (or abode), where registration with NHS is achieved (Ministry of Health, 2012) . In absence of valid public information about the quality of physicians, and given the type of care provided by Italian family doctors, patients generally choose their own physician according to the proximity principle (in order to save time and transportation costs), especially when they require continuative care. In this case, selection bias should not be a concern. On the other hand, in the presence of information about physicians' reputation, for instance, through word-of-mouth, non-random sorting of patients into physicians might occur and the estimated effect of both adherence and PTR would be upward biased. However, even in this case, the concern for selection bias is largely attenuated by the fact that our model (see Section 5 below) controls for both patient's and physician's time-invariant unobserved heterogeneity. The second type of bias arises when an individual decides to change her physician for reasons related to health outcomes. In this case, both adherence and PTR estimated effects would be affected by attrition bias. We study the potential impact of attrition bias in Appendix. Results from our tests suggest that, despite the missing-at-random assumption is rejected, withdrawal attrition does not have a significant impact on the estimated effects. Finally, concerning the agency problem, the asymmetry of information between patients and physician is what makes important to have physician unobserved heterogenity in the empirical specification.
Given these institutional characteristics and the empirical strategy adopted, we should be able to accurately measure a set of important effects. As in the standard Grossman formulation, the individual stock of health (here through one of its specific dimensions) will be higher (a) the higher the effectiveness of medical care, (b) the lower the price of medical care, and (c) the lower the natural health deterioration rate. Unlike in the standard model, (a) a higher patient's adherence to drug treatment works to increase the treatment effectiveness, thus causing an increase in the optimal level of health; (b) under the hypothesis of decreasing marginal returns implicit in the Grossman model, we test if the effectiveness of adherence is monotonically increasing at a decreasing rate; and (c) unobserved patient and physician characteristics can explain a large fraction of health outcome's variability.
DATA AND SUMMARY STATISTICS
Our empirical analysis is based on data obtained from the Health Search Database (HSD), a longitudinal observational database run by the Italian College of General Practitioners (SIMG) since 1998. The HSD contains patient-level data from electronic patient records collected by physicians throughout Italy. Participation of physicians is on a voluntary basis, but their selection guarantees the HSD representativeness at national and regional level (Fabiani et al., 2004) . 5 For our purposes, a subsample of incident patients has been extracted from the HSD. The selection has been conducted using two main inclusion criteria: (a) patients who received a diagnosis of "pure hypercholesterolaemia" (or familiar hypercholesterolaemia) over the period from 2001 to 2007 and (b) patients who started their statins treatment only after the diagnosis and follow their therapy for at least 8 quarters. Since the initial sample consists of daily observations, after having constructed all variables used in the analysis, data have been collapsed in order to obtain patient-level quarterly observations. 6 The resulting final sample is then a quarterly unbalanced panel of 467,636 observations (24,010 patients followed by 623 physicians) with a maximum of 36 quarters of follow-up (for the cohort of incident, patients who received the diagnosis and started the treatment in the first quarter 2001) and at least 8 quarters of follow-up for the 2007 cohort. Patients may change physician, but we cannot observe such movements as they receive a new anonymised personal code at each switch, thus implying that patients are fully "nested" within physicians. 7 Although there is overwhelming evidence that lowering LDL cholesterol concentration below a certain threshold plays a crucial role in building up resistance to CHDs, recent studies have shown that individuals reaching their LDL cholesterol target may still be at increased CHD risk if they have detrimental levels of other parameters of the lipid profile (see, among the others, Lemieux et al., 2001 ). For instance, Lemieux et al. (2001) show that individuals with a TC/HDL-C ratio > 5 had an hazard ratio for future CHD of 2.19 compared with a TC/HDL-C ratio < 5. A ratio less than 4 corresponds to a lower risk profile. Following these findings, in our analysis, we choose as health indicator the TC/HDL-C ratio. Figure 1 shows the average TC/HDL-C ratio by cohort of treatment and year. As can be noted, new cohorts start the statins therapy with a lower risk profile and, on average, all cohorts reach the target although with a different speed.
Concerning explanatory variables, the key covariates are represented by patient's adherence to treatment and PTR. Given a specific medical therapy, a fundamental factor is the patient attitude to follow the therapy. There are various proxies that could be used to approximate this indicator. 8 The two most commonly used measures of medication adherence based on prescription refills' data are defined by the number of prescribed doses in relation to a given period and are (a) the MPR and (b) the PDC. In this study, we use the MPR approach computing for each patient the number of prescribed days of treatment D is the number of days between prescription refills for patient i (excluding the last prescription). Moreover, to avoid an adherence indicator greater than 100%, as is the case for the PDC approach, whenever a patient had one week of medication left from a previous refill, we add this extra days (of medication) to the next period, unless the covered days of the next refill are enough to be 100% adherent. The final adherence index is obtained by taking averages, by quarters and by patients, of the MPR. Figure 2 reports the average adherence by cohort of treatment and year showing that new cohorts start with a higher average drug adherence.
In order to derive a homogeneous indicator of PTR, types and dosage of statin were combined into a single equipotency score according to Maron, Fazio, and Linton (2000; see Table 1 ). In this way, we control for different types and dosages of statins and how they differ in their potential effect in reducing the TC/HDL-C ratio.
The remaining set of covariates includes controls for patient's comorbidities, statins type, and socio-demographic characteristics at patient level. Summary statistics are shown in Table 2 . Among selected patients, 56% are female. In accordance with the distribution of the Italian population, the majority of the patients is concentrated in the North of Italy (23% North-west, 23% North-east), with the centre accounting for about 14%, whereas the South account for another 29%. The average TC/HDL-C ratio is 4.18, whereas the average PTR is 4.29. 9 Simvastatin and atorvastatin are the most prescribed active ingredients. Hypertension and diabetes are the most common comorbidities among our sample patients. Finally, as shown in Figures 3 and 4 , during the study period, both patients' withdrawal, with a maximum of 1% of sample observations lost in the last quarter, and mortality, with a maximum of 0.3% of sample observations lost, do not seem to represent a significant threat for our analysis. 10
ECONOMETRIC MODEL

Specification
The estimation of Equation 1 requires information that are generally unobserved to researchers (e.g., patient genetic endowment, physician ethics, and effort). Moreover, information on patient's education and income and physician's reputation, expertise, and communication skills, although potentially observable, are not available to us. Nevertheless, in a context where the time span of the data is short, these characteristics can be reasonably considered constant over time and therefore can be purged by exploiting the longitudinal nature of our data. It then follows that, by assuming a linear form for the functions g(.), (.) and (.), the empirical counterpart of Equation 1 can be represented by the following multilevel model
9 Generally, an equipotency score greater than or equal to 4 is obtained using new generation statins, because an increase in older statins is limited by the maximum safe dosage. 10 See Appendix for a detailed analysis of attrition in our sample. where y ijt is the log of the TC-HDL ratio of patient i treated by physician j in period t, T i is the total number of quarters of data available for individual i and the indices n i1 , … , n iT i respectively indicate the quarter corresponding to the first observation on individual i through the last observation on that individual, x ijt is a vector of k time-varying exogenous characteristics of patient i treated by physician j at time t, i = i + j where i and j are patient and physician time-invariant unobserved heterogeneity, t are unobserved time effects, and ijt is the idiosyncratic error term. The vector of time-varying patient characteristics (x ijt ) includes dummies for low (0 < adherence t−1 ⩽ 0.4), medium (0.4 < adherence t−1 ⩽ 0.8), and high (adherence t−1 > 0.8) adherence in period t−1, PTR, dummies for statins type, dummies for patient's chronic comorbidities and severe events (diabetes, hypertension, transient ischemic attack, percutaneous transluminal coronary angioplasty, acute myocardial infarction, stroke, and angina), dummies for age quintiles, and quarter dummies. 11 We also consider other model specifications based on specific decompositions for j , allowing for heterogeneous returns to PTR and adherence as part of the physician effect. The first of these defines a physician effect as
where j denotes the physician-specific intercept, PTR ijt denotes the patient i's treatment regime prescribed by physician j = P(i, t) in period t, and j is the physician-specific PTR coefficient. The second decomposition is is a dummy for high adherence, and 1j , 2j , 3j are the physician-specific low, medium, and high adherence coefficients, respectively. Finally, the last and most complete decomposition we consider in the empirical analysis is
where we include also the interactions between adherence dummies and PTR. 12
Identification and consistent estimation of and j
Model (2), and its extensions based on the decompositions in (3), (4), and (5), can be estimated treating patient and physician effects as fixed or random. However, notice that patient's adherence is likely to be strongly correlated with the level of education (see, for instance, Ehiri, 2000) , whereas the PTR strongly depends on the physician's skill and experience (see Davis et al., 1995) . In order to test for these correlations (or equivalently, between random-vs. fixed-effects models), Table 3 reports the results from a set of Hausman specification tests. As expected, fixed-effects models are strongly preferred to random-effects ones.
11 As for adherence, we consider lagged values because statins treatment takes some time to be effective. Moreover, after experimenting with different lags and different distributed lag regression specifications, we find that a one-quarter lag is systematically preferred by standard model selection criteria, such as Akaike information criterion (AIC) and Bayesian information criterion (BIC). Adherence dummies have been constructed using the most used cut-off points in the clinical literature, that is, c = (0.4, 0.8), using as base category no adherence. Nevertheless, our results are robust to a different specification of adherence in the model. Tabulations for alternative models including polynomials of various order (linear, quadratic, and cubic), linear, quadratic, and cubic splines with two knots (0.4,0.8), and different adherence dummies' specifications using alternative cut-off points are available from the corresponding author upon request. 12 We thank an anonymous referee for suggesting this last model specification.
In order to estimate the aforementioned extensions of model (2), we use the consistent approach proposed by Abowd et al. (1999) , well established in labour economics, but so far underutilised in the health economics literature. 13 Only recently, Koulayev et al. (2016) used a model similar to (2) to analyse the contributions of physician-specific, patient-specific, and drug-specific factors to the adherence decision. It is worth noting that, since our data do not capture patients mobility across physicians, patients are fully nested within physicians, and the sample on which the estimation is performed includes only observations satisfying the condition P(i, n it ) = P(i, n it−1 ). Nonetheless, as pointed out by Abowd et al. (1999) , the and j parameters are identified and can be consistently estimated. Clearly, in the context of specification (2), the consistent method used in this paper is inefficient since, for those patients who changed physician at some point in time during our analysis period, we cannot exploit all those observations for which P(i, n it ) ≠ P(i, n it−1 ). In addition to this inefficiency, it is worth emphasising that, since we are exploiting only the observations for which P(i, n it ) = P(i, n it−1 ), we are not able to separately identify physician ( j ) and patient ( i ) intercepts. Indeed, the within-patients transformation conditions out time-invariant characteristics of both patients and physicians, i.e. i = i + j . 14 Nevertheless, this data limitation is not as crucial as it appears, because our main goal is not to disentangle these two unobserved components, but investigate to which extent the adherence and PTR marginal effects are affected by omitted/aggregation variable bias.
EMPIRICAL RESULTS
In this section, we discuss the main empirical findings of our analysis. Table 4 reports the results obtained estimating different variants of model (2), including the first of its extension that adds the decomposition of j reported in Equation 3. Column 1 reports the Ordinary Least Square (OLS) estimates, our benchmark, which completely neglects the role of unobserved heterogeneity (both patients and physicians, thus i = j = 0 in Equation 2); the fixed-effects model for physicians (column 2), which neglects the role of patient's unobserved heterogeneity ( i = 0 in Equation 2), and the fixed-effects model for patients (column 3), which, given the full nesting of patients within physicians, controls for both patient's and physician's unobserved heterogeneity. Finally, column 4 shows the estimates from the fixed-effects model for patients in which j is decomposed as reported in Equation 3, allowing for heterogeneous returns to PTR as part of the physician effect. Overall, this last model is always the best model in terms of adjusted R 2 and = 2 ∕( 2 + 2 ). The goodness-of-fit statistics vary across models, improving when moving from column 1 to columns 3 and 4. Because, as discussed in Section 5, we are not able to separately identify patient and physician time-invariant unobserved heterogeneity, the statistic may be considered as one of the best indicators of the relative importance of this two sources of heterogeneity in our data. We observe that patient and physician heterogeneity are both important determinants of the overall error variance, = 0.069 in column 2 and = 0.721 in column 3, although patient heterogeneity appears to be more important in explaining it. Even though the statistic reported under column 3 includes also the contribution to the overall error variance of the physician heterogeneity, we argue that the aforementioned differential in can be regarded as evidence of the greater importance of patient heterogeneity.
Comparing the benchmark results with those reported in columns 2 and 3 allows to investigate to which extent the parameter of interest are biased due to the omission of physician and/or patient time-invariant unobserved heterogeneity. Furthermore, by considering the between-physicians heterogeneity in the return to PTR, column 4 allows to investigate to which extent the adherence estimates reported in column 3 are affected by the aggregation of the heterogeneous PTR effects.
The existing large body of clinical and medical literature has produced several evidences supporting the key role of adherence and PTR in reaching clinical targets. What our results suggest is that, in an everyday practice setting, (a) not controlling for patient's and/or physician's time-invariant unobserved heterogeneity is likely to result in an omitted variable bias; (b) not controlling for physician's unobserved heterogeneity introduces bias, although its size is noticeably lower than what can occur by not controlling for patient unobserved heterogeneity; 15 (c) the role of adherence is significantly attenuated when moving from column 1 estimates to those in columns 2 and 3; (d) the role of PTR is strongly upward biased when patient's unobserved heterogeneity is neglected; (e) furthermore, not controlling for heterogeneous PTR slopes as a part of the physician effect generates 13 In particular, we use a within-patient transformation of the data instead of the within-patient first-difference transformation proposed by Abowd et al. (1999) . This allows for a fair comparison with the physician fixed-effects model ( i = 0 and j ≠ 0) estimated through a within-physician transformation. The interested reader is referred to Abowd et al. (1999, Section 3. 3) for more details. 14 It is worth noting that by assuming (a) the random sorting of patients into physicians, and (b) physician "pure" unobserved heterogeneity ( j ) is uncorrelated with patient unobserved heterogeneity ( i ), the two sources of heterogeneity can be disentangled following the procedure suggested by Pesaran and Zhou (2017) . In any case, the postestimation of the physician fixed-effects under the aforementioned assumptions offers no further insights with respect to the analysis of the overall error variance reported in Section 6. 15 Notice that, as already discussed in Section 5, the within-patients transformation actually rules out both patient and physician time-invariant unobserved heterogeneity. upward biased estimate of the adherence elasticities, as also corroborated by the formal statistical tests presented in Table 3 ; 16 (f) consistently with clinical evidence, higher levels of adherence reduce the TC/HDL-C ratio; and (g) moving from low to high adherence, this effect is monotonically increasing, but at an increasing rate. Concerning this last point, this is not what one would expect according to the Grossman model. We are convinced that there are at least two reasons why we should not expect decreasing returns in our estimates. First of all, the more recent literature (Galama, Hullegie, Meijer, & Outcault, 2012) has been quite critical with respect to the capacity of obtaining estimates coherent with decreasing returns when estimating a demand function derived from a Grossman-like model. In particular, Galama et al. (2012) highlight that the decreasing returns to scale is a strong assumption used by Grossman because of its theoretically desirable features. Empirically, once they control for the endogeneity of health, the results point toward constant return to scale, thus questioning the robustness of prior estimates in this literature. 17 The second, more compelling, reason why we should not expect decreasing returns is related to the utilisation of "adherence" as the variable upon which we want to estimate the return to health investment. In fact, the adherence effect is characterised by a sharp nonlinearity, well documented in the medical and clinical literature (see Ho et al., 2009, and references therein) . According to these studies, this nonlinearity occurs when medications is available 80% of the time, which defines also patients as adherent. Clearly, this cut-off is somewhat arbitrary; however, it has been used for the majority of studies in the literature on medication adherence, based on both observational data and randomised controlled clinical trials. A more recent analysis points out that there continues to be reductions in LDL cholesterol and blood pressure with adherence levels beyond 80% (e.g., from 80% to 100%), suggesting that the optimal level of adherence may be higher than the aforementioned cut-off. Below the 80% threshold, the increase in adherence may be beneficial for reducing cholesterol (likely in a decreasing way), but statin effect is fully revealed only when adherence is above the 80% threshold, thus interrupting the marginal decreasing nature of the effect. To empirically unravel this phenomenon, we have reestimated our main specification (the one reported in Table 4 , third column) using a cubic polynomial in the lagged adherence and piecewise linear splines with knots set at the same dummies cut-off points (0.4 and 0.8). The results obtained from this robustness check are reported graphically in Figure 5 . As we can clearly see, the cubic polynomial (solid continuous line) and the dummy specification (denoted with small circles in the graph) point in favour of decreasing returns until the 80% threshold and increasing returns above that threshold. On the contrary, piecewise linear splines seem more in favour of increasing returns along the whole spectrum of adherence. These results are perfectly coherent with the above discussion as well as with the main findings reported in recent clinical literature.
In order to provide evidence for the heterogeneity in the PTR effects, Figure 6 plots thêj coefficients, with j = 1, … , 623, obtained under the decomposition of j reported in Equation 3. In particular, the plot shows the range of the estimated effects and their 95% confidence intervals, highlighting the effects that are statistically significant at 5% level. As can be seen, the average returns to PTR present a high degree of variability between physicians. Most of them are, as expected, negative and statistically significant (ranging from −14% to −2%). However, it also turns out that the average effect of PTR for the patients treated by certain physicians is unexpectedly positive (from 4.5% to 21%), suggesting to some extent that these physicians have not been able to match patient disease and treatment properly.
Following the same strategy, Figure 7 plots thêm j coefficients, with m = 1, … , 4 and j = 1, … , 623, obtained under the decomposition of j reported in Equation 4. The first three panels of Figure 7 report the heterogeneous returns to low, medium, and high adherence, whereas the last panel shows the heterogeneous returns to PTR. As for the latter, no appreciable differences can be noted with respect to the results obtained under the decomposition in Equation 3. On the other hand, decomposition (4) reveals a great deal of heterogeneity in the returns to adherence. Interestingly, the average effects of adherence (at physician level) for patients with low adherence range from about −21.5% to −2.5% and only for five physicians these effects are positive and statistically significant. We argue that this unexpected evidence for low adherence patients could be the results of a poor patient-physician relationship. On the other hand, heterogeneous returns to adherence for medium and high adherence patients show a similar pattern of variability, but no positive effects are detected.
Finally, Figure 8 plots the average partial effects (APE) of low, medium, and high adherence computed at different values of PTR for patients treated by physician j, j = 1, … , 623, according to the most heterogeneous decomposition considered in our analysis reported by Equation 5. In particular, the first panel plotsÂPE , accordingly. These graphs allow to visualise the extremely heterogeneous effect of low, medium, and high adherence as the PTR varies in its allowed domain. As expected, a higher (equi)potent dose of statins reduces more the TC-HDL ratio in the presence of higher adherence. A similar pattern of heterogeneity across physicians is observed also for low and medium adherence, further highlighting the crucial role played by physicians in determining patient health status, beyond the treatment regime and the level of drug adherence.
Robustness check: Working with subsamples and dealing with attrition bias
All results presented so far have been based on the total sample. In principle, distinguishing by gender and geographical area should provide a more flexible analysis, with the possibility of highlighting further heterogeneity in the adherence and PTR effects that cannot be otherwise disentangled due to the time-invariant nature of these covariates. Therefore, we have estimated the fixed-effects model for patients (column 3 of Table 4 ) by gender and macro-area of residence, namely, North-West (NW), North-East (NE), Centre (C), and South and Islands (SI). In Table 5 , we report a set of tests in which the null hypothesis is that the coefficients of the lagged adherence dummies and PTR are equal for men and women, pooling all the geographical areas (column Gender), and that the coefficients of the adherence dummies and PTR are equal by geographical area, pooling men and women (column Area). What turns out is that the effect of adherence is not statistically different by gender, whereas some gender heterogeneity is revealed for the effect of PTR. On the other hand, the Wald tests always strongly reject the null of equality by geographical area. Similarly, in Table 6 , we test a finer hypothesis, namely, that the coefficients of the adherence dummies and PTR are equal for men and women within each macro-area of residence (column Gender by area) and that the coefficients of the adherence dummies and PTR are equal by geographical area by gender (column Area by gender). Interestingly, it turns out that, although there are no appreciable differences of the estimated effects for men and women regardless of the macro-area of residence, the differences by macro-area highlighted above are mainly driven by women. 19 Finally, we should consider that patients could change physician during their life (withdrawal) and/or die. These unexpected drops may affect the estimates introducing attrition bias. In order to exclude this possibility, Appendix reports a careful analysis of the attrition affecting our selected sample. Results from a two-step Heckman correction of the estimates reported in column 3 of Table 4 suggest the presence of attrition bias. Nevertheless, in line with the evidence reported in Cheng and Trivedi (2015) , a comparison of the adjusted and unadjusted estimates reveals that, despite the missing-at-random assumption is strongly rejected, withdrawal attrition does not significantly affect the estimates of the TC/HDL ratio equation for the selected incident patients. This evidence is also corroborated by a comparison between the total and nonattriting sample á la Fitzgerald, Gottschalk, and Moffitt (1998) and by the Hausman-like test proposed by Verbeek and Nijman (1992) .
CONCLUSIONS
Our aim with this paper has been to investigate the determinants of a specific indicator of health outcome using a consistent two-level panel data approach that, on top of the standard determinants of health status, controls also for patients and physicians unobserved characteristics. Apart from observing that, as expected, adherence to therapy is important for patient health status, we obtain three further insights, which have been rarely addressed in this type of literature: (a) We find evidence of increasing returns to adherence, (b) omission and/or aggregation of the effects may severely affect the inference in this type of studies, and (c) evidence of high heterogeneity of the return to adherence and PTR by physicians.
These results are rather interesting from a policy perspective. Despite we cannot draw direct policy implications from our empirical analysis (being based on unobserved characteristics), we provide important evidence, which can be used to drive policy interventions. First of all, our results suggest that we should raise patient awareness on the negative effect of having a too high cholesterol levels: A large fraction of patient remain not compliant. Second, differently from randomised clinical trials, we find that, in everyday practice, patient's adherence to drug therapy is not as important as expected. The high heterogeneity of the adherence and PTR effects we find at physician level is a new evidence that policymakers now can exploit, letting them to work in the direction of minimising that heterogeneity. However, we do not provide a specific solution to tackle this issue, which is far beyond the aim of this paper.
An important question is to understand how far these results can be generalised. We expect that they can be applied, in a everyday practice setting, to all other chronic conditions for which adherence to drug treatment is expected to play a crucial role. In this appendix, we provide the results of a study of attrition affecting the sample analysed in this paper and its potential bias on the coefficients of the variables included in our regressions. The estimation sample is a subsample of incident patients extracted from the HSD. The selection has been conducted using two main inclusion criteria: (a) patients who received a diagnosis of "pure hypercholesterolemia" (or familiar hypercholesterolaemia) over the period from 2001 to 2007 and (b) patients who started their statins treatment only after the diagnosis and follow their therapy for at least 8 quarters. The resulting final sample is a quarterly unbalanced panel of 467,636 observations (24,010 patients followed by 623 physicians) with a maximum of 36 quarters of follow-up (for the cohort of incident patients who received the diagnosis and started the treatment in the first quarter 2001) and at least 8 quarters of follow-up for the 2007 cohort. Attrition can arise from withdrawal or death of a study incident patient. Figure A1 describes the pattern of attritors (jointly for withdrawal and death) by cohort of diagnosis across the study period. Conditional attrition rate, defined as the ratio of the number of drop-outs in quarter t and the number of patients in quarter t − 1, is almost always below 1%, with a slight increase in the last quarters of therapy (up to 2.5%), starting from the cohort of 2004 entries. By looking at Figure A2 where the pattern of attritors is reported for withdrawal and death separately, we observe that the increase in the last quarters of therapy is due to patients' withdrawal whereas the average attrition for death is around 0.4% and always below 1%. Even though the extent of attrition due to both death and patients' withdrawal appears to be small, in what follows, we further investigate if our main results are in some way affected by the presence of attrition bias. Following the approach in Fitzgerald et al. (1998) , we compare the estimates reported in column 3 of Table 4 , obtained using the total sample, with those obtained using only the nonattriting sample, the latter excluding 1,281 (death or withdrawal) patients for 21,011 observations. By looking at Table AI , we notice that only the coefficient of the Age:59-64 dummy is significantly different between the total and nonattriting samples. We also perform the Verbeek and Nijman (1992) Hausman-like test contrasting total and nonattriting sample estimates failing, as expected, to reject the null hypothesis that the two set of estimates are not systematically different. We also estimate a Heckman selection model for panel data treating the attrition due to patients' withdrawal as an absorbing state. Let s ijt denote the selection indicator, where s ijt = 1 if, for each quarter t, the patient i followed by physician j is in the sample (and both outcome and covariates are observed), and zero otherwise. In the first step of the Heckman selection model, selection in quarter t, conditionally on being in the sample in quarter t − 1 (s ijt−1 = 1), follows the following probit model 
How to cite this
where 2002q4 is in our sample the first quarter in which we observe a positive attrition rate and w ijt−1 is a vector of both time-varying and time-invariant covariates, the former observed in quarter t − 1. As in Cheng and Trivedi (2015) , instead of estimating t by a sequence of probits where, in each quarter, the estimation sample uses the patients still in the sample in quarter t − 1, we estimate a pooled model where the sequential response function of each quarter t is pooled across quarters 2002q4, … , 2009q4 to maximise statistical power using covariates observed at quarter t − 1. The set of covariates included in w ijt−1 are those included in our main specification plus a dummy for females and a set of macro-area of residence dummies (using South and Islands as base category). Moreover, because identification of the parameters in the outcome equation requires at least an exclusion restriction, we include as instrument in the selection equation the lagged average number of all withdrawals, that is, all revocations suffered by a physician in his or her general practice, which is expected to be positively correlated with the likelihood of withdrawal but is (plausibly) not expected to have a direct effect on the TC/HDL ratio for the selected incident patients. 20 Figure A3 shows the distribution of the instrument by selected quarters. As can be seen, there is enough (plausibly exogenous) variation both in time and across physicians to be exploited for identification. In the second step, after the within-patients transformation is applied to remove the physician ( j ) and patient intercepts ( i ), attrition is accommodated by the inclusion in Equation 2 of the inverse Mills ratio estimated from the pooled attrition model interacted with a set of dummies for quarters from 2002q4 to 2009q4. Table AII (column 1) reports the estimates of the attrition function. The results show a statistically significant and positive relationship between the probability of not withdrawing with low and high adherence. Ceteris paribus, female patients have a lower probability of not withdrawing compared to male, and the same is true for older patients, patients treated with the compound simvastatin + ezetimibe, patients with chronic diabetes or hypertension, and patients living in the north-east or the centre of Italy. Interestingly, patients followed by physicians who suffered a higher number of revocations in his or her general practice are significantly more likely to drop out in the next quarter. Column 2 of Table AII shows the estimates of the attrition-corrected outcome equation, whereas the bottom panel of the table reports a test of the null hypothesis that the quarter-varying inverse Mills ratio is jointly equal to zero. The null is strongly rejected, suggesting the presence of attrition bias. Nevertheless, a comparison of the estimates with those reported in column 3 of Table 4 (i.e., without attrition adjustment) reveals that these estimates are very similar in magnitude. As in Cheng and Trivedi (2015) , this evidence suggests that despite the missing-at-random assumption is strongly rejected, withdrawal attrition does not have a significant impact on the estimates of the TC/HDL ratio equation for the selected incident patients, corroborating the results described above (Table AI) . 
